Spotlight on reporting privilege

On 13 December 2024, the Court of Appeal handed down a judgment in Iqbal v Geo TV  [2024] EWCA Civ 1566 considering in some detail the defence of statutory qualified privilege against a libel claim.

The facts

The claim arises out of a Pakistani political rally during which allegedly defamatory statements were made by a politician about Mr Iqbal, the head of a news network in Pakistan. Geo TV broadcast the event live in the UK and thereafter broadcast frequent bulletins summarising the politician's statement.

Mr Iqbal issued proceedings against Geo for libel. Geo issued an application for summary judgment maintaining that Mr Iqbal had no prospects of success and there was no other compelling reason to go to trial. Geo asserted that it had a complete defence under s.15 of the Defamation Act 1996 on the basis that the broadcasts were fair and accurate reports of proceedings at a public meeting, published without malice.

The law

S.15 of the Defamation Act 1996 provides as follows:

“(1) The publication of any report or other statement mentioned in Schedule 1 to this Act is privileged unless the publication is shown to be made with malice, subject as follows.

(3) This section does not apply to the publication to the public, or a section of the public, of matter which is not of public interest and the publication of which is not for the public
benefit".

The types of statement in Schedule 1 include a “fair and accurate report of proceedings at any public meeting held anywhere in the world”, with public meeting meaning “a meeting bona fide and lawfully held for a lawful purpose and for the furtherance or discussion of a matter of public interest, whether admission to the meeting is general or restricted.”

The High Court Judgment

The High Court Judge found that Mr Iqbal had realistic prospects of success as to whether the statements complained of fell outside of the protection of privilege as a matter that was "not of public interest and the publication of which is not for the public benefit", and also found that the issue of malice could not fairly be determined summarily.

Geo's application was accordingly dismissed. Geo appealed.

The Court of Appeal Judgment

The Court of Appeal found that the High Court Judge should have entered summary judgment for the Defendant.

It agreed without difficulty that the statements were made at a “public meeting” and that a live broadcast constituted a “report” within the meaning of statute.

Further, the statements met the other requirements of s.15(3). S.15 is constructed such that privilege that has been found to apply by virtue of s.15(1) can be disapplied in respect of matter if it is “not in the public interest” and its “publication is not for the public benefit”.

Warby LJ found that these requirements were cumulative such that privilege can only be lost if both conditions are met.

The statements complained of were allegations of bribery and corruption by a senior politician. Warby LJ found that the matter was clearly in the public interest. He did not accordingly need to consider whether publication was for the public benefit, but still found that there was no basis to conclude that it was not. Fair, accurate and thorough reports of statements in a political contest are generally for the public benefit.

As to malice, Mr Iqbal's complaints did not meet the high bar and were found to be at best allegations of careless or irresponsible journalism. A dominant improper motive is incapable in law of defeating a reporting privilege. Knowing or reckless falsity could suffice but Mr Iqbal's case advanced no factual proposition that, if proved at trial, could establish this.

Comment

Qualified reporting privilege is a creature of the common law and grew out of the recognition that there are certain occasions when someone should be free to report potentially defamatory statements without fear of being sued, provided it was done without malice. Parliamentary proceedings are the classic example and s.15 applies this privilege to certain reports of public meetings.

The Court of Appeal has reaffirmed the protection afforded by s.15 of the 1996 Act and clarified its application. The judgment is however a reminder that privilege is not automatic and that publishers must meet all the elements of the defence, for example ensuring reports are fair and accurate, publishing a statement by the claimant when requested to do so, and publishing without malice.

S.15 also applies to very specific circumstances. The Defendant in this case did not push for summary judgment on s.4 of the Defamation Act 2013 which contains the defence often relied upon by publishers where no privilege can arise. Those seeking to rely on this defence must show (i) that the statement related to a matter of public interest and (ii) a reasonable belief that publication was in the public interest, which involves consideration of all the circumstances of the case.

This means that those who publish defamatory statements irresponsibly, for example without attempting to verify the truth of what is being published or giving opportunities to comment, may find themselves liable for significant damages.